Drivers influencing the governance of inter-firm relationships in the biopharmaceutical industry: an empirical survey in the Italian context by Billitteri, C. et al.
This article was downloaded by: [Universita di Palermo], [Giovanni Perrone]
On: 03 January 2013, At: 08:26
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered
office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Technology Analysis & Strategic
Management
Publication details, including instructions for authors and
subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ctas20
Drivers influencing the governance
of inter-firm relationships in the
biopharmaceutical industry: an
empirical survey in the Italian context
Carolina Billitteri a , Giovanna Lo Nigro a & Giovanni Perrone a
a DTMPIG, Università degli Studi di Palermo, Viale delle Scienze,
Ed. 8, 90128, Palermo, Italy
Version of record first published: 03 Jan 2013.
To cite this article: Carolina Billitteri , Giovanna Lo Nigro & Giovanni Perrone (2013): Drivers
influencing the governance of inter-firm relationships in the biopharmaceutical industry: an
empirical survey in the Italian context, Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 25:1, 107-126
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09537325.2012.751010
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-
conditions
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any
substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,
systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.
The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation
that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any
instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary
sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings,
demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or
indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 2013
Vol. 25, No. 1, 107–126, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09537325.2012.751010
Drivers influencing the governance
of inter-firm relationships in the
biopharmaceutical industry: an empirical
survey in the Italian context
Carolina Billitteri, Giovanna Lo Nigro and Giovanni Perrone∗
DTMPIG, Università degli Studi di Palermo, Viale delle Scienze, Ed. 8, 90128, Palermo, Italy
This paper focuses on factors influencing the choice of the governance form in inter-firm
relationships (IFRs) between pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies. By reviewing
the relevant literature on transaction cost economics, property right theory, real option and
resources-based view, we located some drivers that might influence such relationships and we
formulated a set of hypotheses linking them to governance forms. Such a theoretical frame-
work has been empirically tested through a survey conducted among the Italian companies
associated to Farmindustria. Empirical results provide some interesting insights on how shap-
ing bio-pharmaceutical deals; we found that the developmental stage of the product/technology
object of the agreement, the existence of previous collaborations between firms and the number
of products marketed by the biotech company are able to influence the selection of a specific
governance form.
Keywords: biopharmaceutical industry; inter-firm relationship; governance form; survey
1. Introduction
Since the mid 1970s, the pharmaceutical industry has experienced a technology discontinuity in its
core process. Indeed, the emergence of biotechnology brought in a new framework the processes
of drugs discovery, development and manufacture compared to the traditional, chemical-based,
pharmaceutical method (Tushman and Anderson 1986).
Biotechnology has been representing a competence-destroying technology on the R&D hand,
because it requires knowledge and technical skills fundamentally different from those developed
by pharmaceutical companies. Rothaermel (2001a) estimated that the skill loss for a scientist
making the transition from the traditional chemical-based framework to the new biotechnology
one is between 80 and 100%. However, unlike other industries, the effect of this radical change
has not been disruptive for the traditional pharmaceutical firms. Indeed, biotechnology companies
∗Corresponding author. Email: giovanni.perrone@unipa.it
© 2013 Taylor & Francis
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108 C. Billitteri et al.
have not replaced incumbents, because they still owned important strategic assets in developing
such new biopharmaceutical products (Rothaermel 2001b)
This situation has created positive opportunities for collaborations between the new sources
of technical expertise and the established firms (Pisano 1990); indeed, the biopharmaceutical
industry designs and supplies drugs, which derive from biotech research, but are developed by
both types of firms (Sabatier, Mangematin, and Rousselle 2010). For this reason, since the mid
1970s, this industry has been characterised by an increasing recourse to inter-firm relationships
(IFRs) between pharmaceutical firms and biotechnology companies.
The explanation of this phenomenon is related to the fact that, on the one hand, a pharmaceutical
firm wishing to commercialise a biotechnology-based drug needs to acquire the necessary compe-
tencies or by developing the required R&D capabilities in-house or sourcing them from outside,
i.e. from a biotechnology firm (Chiesa and Toletti 2004). On the other hand, a biotech company
that has developed a new compound or a technological platform and desires to bring it into the
market often lacks critical functions or capabilities such as drugs manufacturing and marketing.
Indeed, according to McCutchen and Swamidass (2004) biotechnology firms are ‘functionally
incomplete’. Moreover, non-technological assets owned by incumbents often generate more value
than the technological ones: especially, marketing and distribution assets that assure the access
to the market (Tripsas 1997). Furthermore, pharmaceutical firms possess other non-technological
assets, such as an established reputation and capitals, which are fundamental to commercialise
the new technologies (Stuart, Hoang and Hybels 1999)
Thus, the presence of strong complementarities is one of the main reasons why pharmaceutical
and biotech companies are cooperating, instead of competing. Furthermore, pharmaceutical firms
have been facing with some threats, such as the increase of R&D costs and the decline of R&D
productivity (DiMasi, Hansen, and Grabowski 2003; Higgins and Rodriguez 2006; Bradfield
and El-Sayed 2009), the expiration of many patents and the increasing competition from generic
pharmaceutical firms. Conversely, biotechnology firms have technological assets that allow facing
with such threats (Danzon, Epstein, and Nicholson 2007).
The last source of complementarities is on the financial side. Indeed, the drug development
process is long, costly and highly uncertain: it requires 10–15 years from research to market, costs
vary from US$800 million (DiMasi, Hansen, and Grabowski 2003; Goozner 2004) up to US$1.2
billion for a biopharmaceutical drug and the attrition rate can reach the 98% (DiMasi 2001). The
above considerations highlight how extraordinarily important is financing in the biotech industry.
Biotech start-ups usually obtain capital through two different sources: venture capital financing or
by entering strategic deals with other firms (Pisano 2006). More mature companies can instead rely
on products and technologies commercialisation, as well as on intellectual assets (i.e. patents) and
services sale. However, biotech companies, which have never sold any product, lack enough cash
flow for their R&D activities. Supporting this point of view, Pisano (2006) highlights how, despite
the commercial success of companies such as Amgen and Genentech, most biotechnology firms
earn no profit. On the contrary, established pharmaceutical firms have high financial resources as
a result of their blockbusters and their long presence in the market. Thus, entering into agreements
with pharmaceutical firms represents an extremely important strategic tool for biotech companies
(Pisano 2006).
While the aforementioned complementarities provide reasons why pharmaceutical and biotech
companies should cooperate, questions arise about the governance of such IFRs. Starting from the
seminal work of Pisano (1990), several scholars raised the question about what kind of governance
mode is preferable to manage biopharmaceutical IFRs and what drivers influence the governance
choice in this industry. In particular, by analysing the most relevant literature on the drivers
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Drivers influencing the governance of inter-firm relationships 109
influencing inter-firm relationships (IFRs) in the biopharmaceutical sector, we locate the main
gaps in the literature and we state the research motivation for this study (Section 2). In Section
3 we develop our theoretical framework that is empirically tested through a survey (Section 4),
whose results are discussed in Section 5. Discussion, limitation and conclusions are then presented
(Section 6).
2. Literature analysis and research motivation
In literature several theoretical strands have examined drivers influencing the governance of inter-
firm relationships, including transaction cost economics (TCE) (Williamson 1979, 1985, 1991),
resource-based view (RBV) (Kogut and Zander 2002; Zollo, Reuer, and Singh 2002), property
right theory (PRT) (Hart and Moore 1990) and real options theory (RO) (Folta 1998; Kogut 1991).
TCE focuses on transaction characteristics such as investment specificity and uncertainty,
studying how these factors increase the opportunism risk in the relationship and the associated
transaction costs; in order to reduce these costs, a hierarchical governance solution is required
when investments are idiosyncratic and uncertainty is high (Williamson 1985).
Consistently with TCE considerations, Pisano (1990) empirically observes how pharmaceutical
companies increasingly tend to undertake biotechnology R&D projects internally, rather than
outsourcing them, because of issues that influence the relational risk perception of the firms, such
as small-numbers bargaining problem, biotechnology R&D experience and the firm’s dependence
on the pharmaceutical business. In order to seek clarity, according to Lo Nigro and Abbate (2010),
we refer to ‘relational risk’, as the risk coming from the possibility of opportunistic behaviours of
partners, while ‘performance risk’, that is its complementary side, is the risk incurred if partners
behave as agreed (contract completeness).
Gulati (1995) is one of the first researchers who studies how trust between partners influences
the choice of the governance form; indeed, he shows how trust, often measured by the number of
previous ties between the same companies, reduces the relational uncertainty and the appropriation
concern at the same time, leading to less hierarchy-oriented transactions. Gulati and Singh (1998)
analyses how coordination uncertainty among interdependent entities, appropriation concern and
low level of trust lead to more hierarchical governance forms.
Oxley (1997), by using a TCE point of view, analyses the appropriation concern, an issue related
to the PRT framework; she shows how the width of the transaction focus, the range of products
or technologies and the involvement of different geographical areas increase the appropriability
hazard, pushing towards more hierarchical governance forms (i.e. equity joint venture). Coming
to another important TCE driver influencing the structure of IFRs, that is uncertainty, while the
impact of the investment specificity is quite acknowledged by the empirical literature (David and
Han 2004), TCE prediction about the linkage between uncertainty and governance form remains
ambiguous (Mahoney 1992). This is also because, conversely to the TCE view, the real option
(RO) theory (Myers 1977) argues that uncertainty leads firms to prefer more flexible and less
hierarchical governance, in order to avoid the opportunity cost of irreversible investments in
shared ventures (Folta 1998).
The papers by Santoro and McGill (2005) and Van de Vrande, Vanhaverbeke, and Duysters
(2009) investigate how this different view on transaction uncertainty can influence the choice of a
continuum of governance forms between market and hierarchy. Santoro and McGill (2005) analyse
the influence of asset co-specialisation, partner and task uncertainty and technology uncertainty
on the choice among five different governance forms: one-way licensing, bilateral cross licensing,
bilateral non licensing, minority equity and joint ventures (JVs). Consistently with TCE, they find
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110 C. Billitteri et al.
that co-specialised assets increase the likelihood of hierarchical governance and partner and task
uncertainty increases this effect. Consistently with RO, technological uncertainty decreases the
likelihood of hierarchical governance. Alternatively, Van de Vrande, Vanhaverbeke, and Duysters
(2009) analyse the impact of environmental turbulence, technology newness, technology distance
and prior ties on five different governance forms: non-equity technology alliances, corporate
venture capital (CVC) investments, minority holdings, JVs and M&As. Again, appealing to TCE
and RO, they obtain a controversial support to the two theoretical strands.
However, several scholars have pointed out how TCE and RO theories provide an incomplete
explanation of what influence the choice of governance forms. In particular, the resource-based
view (RBV) perspective emphasises how partners bring into an alliance their valuable resources
and through the alliance they are interested both in acquiring their partners’valuable resources and
in protecting their own resources during the alliance-making process. Thus, the RBV view about
governance form is to find a structure able to balance the two issues: being able to procure valuable
resources from another party without losing the control of one’s own resources. According to Das
and Teng (2000), the involved resources typology, property-based vs knowledge-based, strongly
shapes the alliance governance; thus, although the governance form choice depends on how
resource typologies of the two parties are mixed in the relationship, property-based resources
push toward more market-oriented governance forms, while knowledge-based resources push
toward more integrated modes. By following Das and Teng’s theoretical perspective, Chen and
Chen (2003) compare TCE and RBV points in shaping the choice between contractual alliances
and equity JVs. They find that, while the transaction cost model is powerful in explaining the
choice between JVs and contractual alliances, the resource-based perspective provides useful
insights into the choice between two distinctive forms of contractual alliances, namely, exchange
and integration alliances.
Moreover, Steensma, and Fairbank (1999) utilise both RBV and RO perspectives in a com-
plementary fashion to hypothesise how certain perceived attributes of the technology such as
imitability, rarity, uncertainty and dynamism influence the governance mode. The authors find
significant support for both theories since, according to RBV, the more strategic in terms of
imitability and rarity the resources are, the more likely firms will chose hierarchical arrangements
(JVs or M&As). Also, according to RO perspective, firms are more likely to pursue arms-length
licensing arrangements when uncertainty, in terms of technological and commercial success,
is high.
Furthermore, Rosiello (2007) analyses the issue of the governance choice both from a TCE
and a RBV perspective. He analyses transaction factors, such as sunk costs and uncertainty,
and resources characteristics, such as replaceability, complexity and replicability. He shows how
technological and demand uncertainty and complexity of resources make collaborative agreements
more likely than standard contracts, confirming in this way both TCE and RBV perspectives.
Table 1 summarises the principal contributions previously discussed. For each paper reviewed,
Table 1 highlights the theoretical focus, the main drivers addressed, the operationalisation of the
drivers, the governance forms analysed and the typology of each paper, i.e. whether it is only
theoretical or also empirical.
From the analysis of Table 1, the reader can see how the main drivers influencing the choice
of governance form so far studied in the literature come from different theoretical strands and
they are: asset specificity (TCE), uncertainty (TCE, RO), appropriation concern and resources’
typology (TCE, PRT, RBV) and trust (TCE).
As also stressed by literature on the governance structure of IFRs (Leiblein 2003; Leiblein and
Miller 2003; Patelli 2009; Foss and Roemer 2010) we strongly believe that the lack of empirical
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Table 1. Synthesis of the main contributions on drivers influencing the governance choice.
Theoretical
Paper focus Main driver Operationalised drivers Governance modes Type of paper
Santoro and McGill
(2005)
TCE Asset specificity Asset co-specialisation One-way licensing Empirical data bank analysis
on the biopharmaceutical
industry
RO Uncertainty Partner uncertainty Bilateral cross licensing
Task uncertainty Bilateral not licensing
Technological uncertainty Minority equity alliances
Joint Ventures
Van de Vrande,
Vanhaverbeke, and
Duysters (2009)
TCE Uncertainty Environmental uncertainty Non-equity technology
alliances
Empirical data bank analysis
on the biopharmaceutical
industryRO Trust Technology uncertainty CVC investments
Prior ties Minority holdings
Joint Ventures
M&As
Oxley (1997) TCE Appropriation concern Transaction focus Unilateral contractual
alliances
Empirical multi-industry data
bank analysis
PRT Range of products or
technologies
Bilateral contractual
alliance
Wideness of geographic area Equity alliances
Gulati (1995) TCE Uncertainty Previous ties Non-equity alliances Empirical multi-industry data
bank analysisTrust Different nationality Equity alliances
Different firms
Gulati and Singh
(1998)
TCE Uncertainty Interdependence Contractual alliances Empirical multi-industry data
bank analysisAppropriation concern Technological uncertainty Minority equity
investments
Trust Appropriability regime
uncertainty
Joint Ventures
Prior ties
Das and Teng (2000) RBV Resource typology Property-based resources Unilateral contractual
alliances
Theoretical paper
Knowledge-based resources Bilateral contractual
alliances
(Continued)
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Table 1. Continued.
Theoretical
Paper focus Main driver Operationalised drivers Governance modes Type of paper
Minority equity alliance
Joint venture
Steensma and
Fairbank (1999)
RBV Resource typology Number of previous alliances
or JVs
Licensing Survey not on the
biopharmaceutical
industryRO Uncertainty Resource potential economic
rent
Joint development
alliances
Resource uncertainty Acquisition
Chen and Chen
(2003)
TCE Asset specificity Asset specificity Contractual alliance Survey not on the
biopharmaceutical
industry
RBV Resource typology Technological and
environmental uncertainty
Joint Ventures
Uncertainty Resource dependency and
complementarity
Rosiello (2007) TCE Asset specificity Sunk costs Standard contracts Survey on the
biopharmaceutical
industry
RBV Resource typology Uncertainty Collaborative agreements
Uncertainty Resource replaceability, com-
plexity, non replicability
and strategicity
Integrated structures
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Drivers influencing the governance of inter-firm relationships 113
studies that integrate findings coming from different theoretical approaches is unfortunate for
several reasons. First, the importance of common concepts, such as uncertainty and appropriation
concern, suggests that important connections exist that may enhance our understanding of organ-
isational governance. Also, some research has demonstrated that the failure to integrate theories
of organisational governance choice may lead to misleading empirical findings (Leiblein, Reuer,
and Dalsace 2002). Thus, the clear separation between these theories, namely the fact that past
research focused on just one or two theoretical strands at the same time, is in our opinion, a
limitation in the available literature that we would like to overcome. Therefore, the first contribu-
tion of the present research is to develop a framework combining all the aforementioned drivers,
contributions and theoretical perspectives coming from all past research efforts.
Second, it should be noticed how all the reviewed research formulate their theoretical frame-
works (hypotheses sets) on non operazionalised drivers; while this approach is aimed at developing
a general framework, it is unable to capture the specificity of a given industry. Such a problem
is quite evident with the driver “uncertainty”; indeed, although the relationship between uncer-
tainty and firm’s governance decisions is stressed in much of the existing literature, empirical
studies often find contradictory results. Depending on the typology of uncertainty considered,
i.e. behavioural uncertainty, technological uncertainty or demand uncertainty, researchers have
demonstrated positive/negative relationship between uncertainty and integrated solutions. These
contradictions may be due to the different sources of uncertainty considered and also to the variety
of measures employed by researchers (Sutcliffe and Zaheer 1998). On the contrary, our goal is
to formulate hypotheses directly on operationalised drivers, distinguishing for example between
factors influencing relational uncertainty rather than technological uncertainty. In this way we are
also able to gather factors that are very specific to the biopharmaceutical industry. Of course in
this way we obtain a less general framework, but very focalised and consistent with the industry
and more useful from a managerial point of view. Third, we introduce a new driver that is very
specific to this industry, i.e. the level of ‘functional completeness’. As previously stressed, this
characteristic is the main motivation of collaborations between pharmaceutical companies and
biotech ones, and in our opinion, the level of completeness of the biotech company is able to
influence the choice of governance form. Because of the introduction of such a new driver, we
analyse the dual perspective problem deriving from the extent of conflicting objectives and a bar-
gaining power problem between biotech and pharmaceutical companies, an issue often neglected
in literature.
Finally, we want to highlight that because of the wideness of our analysis, in term of theoretical
strands and drivers, we concentrate on one single transaction of assets, as the unit of analysis;
namely, we focus on the transaction of a biotech-based compound or technology under devel-
opment or already developed, that comes from the biotech company’s research. Thus, our focus
being on how established pharmaceutical firms approach the new technology, we consider that
they can select one of the following possibilities: (i) get the licence of a product already devel-
oped through a licensing agreement, (ii) share resources and efforts in order to jointly develop
the compound (i.e. R&D alliances), (iii) create a new legal entity that assumes the ownership
of the asset (i.e. JVs) or (iv) acquire the biotech firm in order to internalise the transaction and
obtain the rights of all the products and assets of the acquired firm (M&As). We do not consider
co-manufacturing, co-marketing and co-commercialisation agreements. Thus, as the reader can
see from the analysis of Table 1, by considering all the spectrum of possibilities from pure market
transactions to totally integrated solutions, we try to overcome another limitation in the available
literature, since most of the previous research limited their analysis to the choice between different
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114 C. Billitteri et al.
alliance types, mainly equity vs non-equity alliances, not considering all the modalities through
which firms can build relations.
3. Theoretical framework developing
As anticipated in Section 2, this paper studies the choice between four different governance
modes: licensing agreements, R&D alliances, JVs and M&As. A licensing agreement represents
the governance form closer to the market; it is an arm’s-length transaction, in which there is
a unilateral technology flow from one firm to another one (Williamson 1985). Usually, in the
biopharmaceutical industry, the pharmaceutical firm gains the right to use a technology developed
by the biotech company in exchange for royalty payments.Along the market–hierarchy continuum,
we then locate non-equity R&D alliances, which imply a certain degree of collaboration between
partners because of resources and risk sharing. Then, moving towards the hierarchy, we consider
equity joint ventures that, through the creation of a new legal entity, are used to share resources
and risk in a more structured and integrated way. Finally, firms may decide to internalise the
transaction through a merger or an acquisition.
The theoretical framework proposed here is based on the literature review discussed in Section
2. Indeed, the analysis of past research leads us to detect five main drivers that influence the
governance of IFRs: asset specificity, uncertainty, appropriation concern, resource typology and
trust. Starting from these main drivers we identify some operationalised measures that are specific
of the biopharmaceutical industry, on which we formulate our hypotheses.
3.1. Investment specificity
As highlighted in the literature review, David and Han (2004) provide strong empirical support
on how asset specificity increases transaction costs and creates a greater opportunism risk. In
this case, TCE suggests internalising the transaction in order to reduce these costs. In other
respects, in order to protect strategic assets arising from inter-firm specific investments, also PRT
suggests gaining the property of these assets. The above considerations lead us to the first driver
significantly influencing the relationship, i.e. the presence of transaction-specific investment (d1);
thus, we posit:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): If the level of transaction-specific investment (d1) is high, the pharmaceu-
tical firm will prefer a more hierarchical governance form.
3.2. Uncertainty
The presence of uncertainty, coming from both performance and relational risk, is a crucial fac-
tor in governance choice of IFRs. Specifically in R&D inter-firm relationships, it is generally
acknowledged how the ‘technological newness’ is one of the most important fonts of uncertainty
(Van de Vrande, Vanhaverbeke and Duysters 2009). Moreover, as highlighted by Pisano (2006),
in biotechnology R&D the levels of risk and uncertainty go well beyond what is entailed in nor-
mal R&D. Also, the emergence of biotechnology is considered a radical process innovation in the
pharmaceutical industry (Stuart, Hoang and Hybels 1999), since the activities of chemical synthe-
sis deployed by traditional incumbents are becoming quite obsolete within the new biotechnology
paradigm. So, beyond the classical distinction between incremental innovation (drug enhance-
ment) and radical innovation (new drug development) (Cardinal 2001), the depth of innovation
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Drivers influencing the governance of inter-firm relationships 115
in this industry can be associated with the extent to which the new process paradigm, the biotech
one, is used to enhance former pharmaceutical products, or even to develop new classes of drugs.
Of course, the ‘technological distance’, i.e. the dissimilarities between the knowledge bases of
the partners contributes to the depth of innovation; indeed, a pharmaceutical company that has
no knowledge or experience in the biotechnology process, ‘feels’ a higher technological distance
and therefore, a more radical innovation. However, while this last issue concerns the relational
uncertainty, the former being more technical, impacts on the performance.
Thus, we identify the depth of innovation (d2) as an important driver that must be taken into
account in order to cope with both performance and relational uncertainty. In this case, RO
literature suggests that investment affected by high levels of uncertainty might be considered as
the creation of an option, which might be exercised at a later point in time using a more integrated
solution; these investments should preserve their intrinsic nature of options. This means that,
when the partner’s technology is quite novel, the pharmaceutical firm will be more likely to
pursue market agreements, such as non-equity alliances, in order to remain flexible and to reduce
the failure risk maintaining the intrinsic options (Vanhaverbeke, Duysters and Noorderhaven
2002). Pisano (1990) also suggests the use of less integrated governance forms under conditions
of technological newness. From an RBV perspective, the deeper the innovation, the more the
resources involved are firm-specific, property-based (for instance patents, human resources) and
less transferable; this occurrence increases the relational risk, since it is quite difficult to evaluate
both the strategic value and degree of transferability of such a resource. Hence, the investing
firm can address the high relational uncertainty surrounding new technologies through small
initial investments, so called ‘learning investments’ (Janney and Dess 2004), which are specific
of market-oriented governance forms. Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): If the level of depth of innovation (d2) is high, the pharmaceutical company
will prefer a more market-oriented governance form.
Another interesting driver affecting performance uncertainty in the biopharmaceutical industry
is the development stage of the product/technology (d3) object of the deal. Indeed, failure risk
is greater in the very early phases of the R&D process. The drug development process is com-
posed by four macro phases prior to commercialisation: the drug discovery phase, the preclinical
development, the clinical trials (composed by three stages, i.e. phase I, phase II and phase III)
and the approval phase. Each of these steps is complex and uncertain, so that the more advanced
the development stage, the more likely the drug succeeds in reaching the market; it should be
considered that even when a drug has completed phase II-A of clinical studies, the expected
probability of success does not even reach 50% (DiMasi 2001). Thus, since in early stages per-
formance risk is high, while the relational one is quite low, according to RO, the investing firm
prefers alliances to acquisitions (Lambe and Spekman 1997). Also Higgins and Rodriguez (2006)
suggest that pharmaceutical firms seeking early stage research may best accomplish their goal
using strategic alliances. On the other respect, as projects move further along the development
process, pharmaceutical firms give up more rights if they try to access those products via an
alliance. According to PRT, it may be more beneficial for firms to make an acquisition, in order
to acquire the biotech product’s rights and avoid any potential costly hold-up issues (Klein and
Murphy 1997). So, moving along the development stage technological uncertainty (performance
risk) decreases and appropriation concern, owing to the relational risk increases. Therefore, the
following hypothesis can be formulated:
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116 C. Billitteri et al.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): If the development of the product/technology (d3) is at a late stage, the
pharmaceutical firm will prefer a more hierarchical governance model.
The reader should note that the biotech firm’s perspective regarding d3 is instead opposite. Indeed,
the amount invested till the agreement date to carry out a compound development up to a late stage
will induce the biotech to put up greater resistance to an acquisition; indeed, if the biotech has
been able to carry out the compound up to a late stage, it will try to complete the last stages by its
own in order to maintain all the compound rights. Therefore, a bargaining power concern emerges
in this case.
Going back to the concept of ‘technological distance’, it has been proved how it affects uncer-
tainty in technology agreements (Van de Vrande, Vanhaverbeke, and Duysters 2009) Specifically,
technological distance in bio-pharma R&D relationships, may occur in two main cases: (i) when
the two firms are not specialised in the same therapeutic areas and (ii) when the pharmaceutical
firm has never developed biotechnology in-house. It is here noteworthy to mention that a pharma-
ceutical firm can be catalogued as a ‘biopharmaceutical’ company or as a ‘pure’ one, depending
on whether the firm has developed in-house biotech competencies.
Therefore, we detect other two fundamental drivers in the governance form choice related to
uncertainty: the overlapping of therapeutic areas (d4) and the integration of the pharma in the
biotech field (d5). Both drivers are signs of similarities or dissimilarities between the knowledge
base of the two partners. Large dissimilarities lead to two types of problems. The first one concerns
the ‘absorptive capacity’(Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Indeed the pharmaceutical firm has a limited
internal scientific capability first, to sort out which projects are attractive and which are ‘lemons’
(Pisano 2006), and second, to absorb and integrate the new technology. In this case, Gulati
and Singh (1998) suggest a more integrated governance form in order to facilitate the effective
transfer of distant knowledge. A large technological distance between partners may then also
lead to relational uncertainty and opportunistic behaviours owing to information asymmetry. So,
according to TCE higher level of integration becomes a more attractive alternative.
These argumentations bring us to the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4a (H4a): If the partners are not specialised in the same therapeutic areas (d4), the
pharmaceutical firm will prefer a more hierarchical governance model.
Hypothesis 5a (H5a): If the pharmaceutical firm is not integrated in the biotech field (d5), it
will prefer a more hierarchical governance model.
In contrast other researchers, such as Pisano (1990), observe how a firm that is not yet familiar
with the technological know-how of its partner will have first to learn from the partner through an
arm’s length transaction before being able to accumulate knowledge. Indeed, Pisano (1990) argues
that a firm’s ability to internalise new projects may depend on the number of its previous in-house
projects in the relevant technology. This reasoning is consistent with the concept of ‘dynamic
capabilities’ in the RBV theoretical stream (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). As matter of fact,
dynamic learning capabilities have been observed in the biopharmaceutical industry in contexts
such as product development (Deeds, DeCarolis, and Coombs 1999), project development (Pisano
2000) and international diffusion of technology (Madhok and Osegowitsch 2000). Therefore, if
a pharmaceutical company is integrated in the biotech field or, alternatively, is specialised in
the same therapeutic area of its biotech partner, it has already developed internal knowledge-
based resources in the field and therefore it will prefer a more hierarchical governance form,
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Drivers influencing the governance of inter-firm relationships 117
because learning occurs most efficiently inside the organisation rather than across organisational
boundaries. On the contrary it will prefer a market transaction. Therefore, looking at these drivers
from a RBV perspective as resource typologies owned by the pharmaceutical firm we hypothesise
two alternatives to H4a and H5a:
Hypothesis 4b (H4b): If the partners are specialised in the same therapeutic areas (d4), the
pharmaceutical firm will prefer a more hierarchical governance model.
Hypothesis 5b (H5b): If the pharmaceutical firm is integrated in the biotech field (d5), it will
prefer a more hierarchical governance model.
3.3. Trust
Several scholars highlight the importance of characteristics such as trust, reputation, commitment,
cooperation and communication for the success of IFRs (Gulati 1995; Gulati, Nohria, and Zaheer
2000). Delerue (2004) finds that relational risk perception is mitigated by trust in biopharmaceu-
tical relations. Indeed, trust and reputation establish norms and expectations about appropriate
behaviour, lowering the perception of opportunism risk. The existence of previous relations (d6)
between the partners is generally assumed as a measure of trust in a relationship, because it
allows a better evaluation of partner’s resources, capabilities and reliability (Gulati 1995). Thus,
the number of previous ties influences the choice of the governance in the subsequent relation
modifying the assessments of transaction costs associated with a specific alliance and limiting the
fears of opportunistic behaviour.
Authors such as Gulati (1995) and Parkhe (1993) suggest that trust can be a substitute for
hierarchical contracts in many exchanges and serves as an extra-contractual control mechanism.
Several authors (Gulati 1995; Ring and Van der Ven 1994; and Santoro and McGill 2005) have
found empirical support that the familiarity established among partners mitigates the hold-up
risk and leads to market-oriented models. Finally, trust improves the absorptive capacity of the
partners in a relationship, reducing also the performance risk. Therefore, we posit:
Hypothesis 6 (H6): The existence of previous relations (d6) between partners will be positively
related to a more market-oriented governance form.
3.4. Functional completeness
Finally, beyond the drivers already analysed in literature, we consider a new one that is very
specific of this industry, i.e. the level of functional completeness of a firm. We refer to the ability
of the biotechnology firm to bring products into the market, thus we operationalise it by the
number of commercialised products (d7). This is a measure of the biotech’s expertise to complete
its value chain by bringing its products to the market, obtaining in this way cash to finance its
research activity. Surely, a company that has already marketed products is more attractive for a
possible acquisition. Indeed, first, the pharmaceutical company can easily evaluate the economic
value of its partner, and second, by an acquisition it inherits the control of the marketed biotech
products. In this case, the performance risk being very low, the pharmaceutical firm will try to
minimise the relational risk and therefore the appropriation concern, by acquiring the partner.
This reasoning leads us to formulate the following hypothesis:
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118 C. Billitteri et al.
Table 2. Synthesis of the theoretical framework.
Operationalised Main Theories supporting Empirical
driver driver the hypothesis Hypothesis support
d1: Transaction-specific
investment
Asset specificity TCE H1 NO
PRT
d2: Depth of innovation Uncertainty RO H2 NO
Resource typology RBV
d3: Development stage of the
product/technology
Uncertainty RO H3 YES
Appropriation concern PRT
d4: Therapeutic areas Uncertainty TCE H4a NO
Absorptive capacity
Resource typology RBV H4b NO
d5: Integration of the pharma in
the biotech field
Uncertainty TCE H5a NO
Absorptive capacity
Resource typology RBV H5b NO
d6: Previous relations Trust TCE H6 YES
Absorptive capacity
d7: Number of commercialised
products
Functional completeness TCE H7 YES
Appropriation concern PRT
Hypothesis 7 (H7): The higher the number of commercialised products (d7) by the biotech
firm, the more the pharmaceutical company will prefer a more hierarchical governance form.
We underline, however, that the biotech company point of view is very different. Indeed, the higher
the number of commercialised products, the more the company is functionally complete and able
to finance new R&D projects individually, the more it will avoid being acquired. Therefore,
because of the opposite objectives of the parties, the governance mode, in this case, will also
depend on who has the greater bargaining power.
A synthesis of the theoretical framework discussed above is reported in Table 2.
4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Research setting
To test the above hypotheses set, we analysed the Italian biopharmaceutical sector through a survey
that was conducted in collaboration with Farmindustria (the Italian Association of Pharmaceu-
tical and Biotechnology companies). Farmindustria aggregates approximately 204 companies
(biotechs, biopharmaceuticals and pure pharmaceuticals), most of which are Italians. Out of these
204 firms, 18 are pure biotech companies; these companies were not included in the survey
because they were too few and, principally, because, in all those cases in which we expect con-
flicting outcomes, our hypotheses are formulated by expressing the biopharmaceutical company
perspective. Finally, a substantial part of the firms contacted, which are either foreign subsidiaries
of big pharmas, with only sales departments in Italy, or small Italian biopharmaceutical compa-
nies, explained to us that they could not answer our questionnaire because they do not make any
strategic decisions about bio-pharmaceutical agreements. Therefore, the eligible sample for our
survey was reduced to 52 companies.
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Drivers influencing the governance of inter-firm relationships 119
4.2. Data collection and sample
Data collection was based on a survey that was conducted using a questionnaire that, with the
support of Farmindustria, was pre-tested on two sample companies. Subsequently, the question-
naire was illustrated to a representative of each company by a phone call interview. Finally, each
company representative returned us the completed questionnaire by e-mail. The duration of the
investigation was of about 3 months. We received a total of 40 questionnaires out of 52, from
pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical companies. A large proportion of the respondents (75%)
were large Italian companies with more than 250 employees and annual turnovers exceeding ¤50
million. Despite the rather small size of the sample, it must be kept in mind that our sample
represents nearly 20% of the total population (204 firms) and 77% of the eligible population
(52 firms). Moreover, the respondents account for 35% of the whole turnover of the industry
and, by considering that 50% of the whole turnover results from Italian subsidiaries of foreign
firms only selling products in Italy, one recognises how our sample is representative of the Italian
biopharmaceutical industry.
From the respondents we collected data on 51 bio-pharmaceutical IFRs divided into 11 licensing
agreements, 16 non-equity R&D alliances, four joint ventures and 20 mergers or acquisitions.
Finally, since a certain number of companies in the sample failed to respond we controlled for
a non-response bias. Comparing the respondents with the non-respondents on company sales
volume and number of employees, and comparing the early and late respondents on the model
variables, the t-tests showed no significant differences, suggesting that the response bias is not a
significant problem in this study.
4.3. Variables and measures
4.3.1. Dependent variable: governance form
We model governance forms G as a three-level nominal variable taking values of: 0 for licensing
agreements, 1 for non-equity R&D alliances and 2 for joint-ventures and M&As. The reason
of such a modelling choice is straightforward. As explained in Section 3, we consider licensing
agreements as the governance form closest to a pure market transaction through which the phar-
maceutical firm seeks to gain the right to use the technology developed by the biotech company.
In contrast, we consider JVs and M&As as the closest to hierarchical structures, because of the
increasing level of vertical integration. In particular in our analysis, we grouped JVs and M&As
together because the number of JVs in our data is quite irrelevant, just four, in comparison with
M&As. Finally, R&D contractual alliances lie in the middle between market and hierarchy. The
reader should notice how almost every scholar reviewed in Table 1 has adopted a quite similar
modelling of the governance form variable addressing the same motivations as above.
4.3.2. Independent variables
The scale used for each independent variable derives from a specific question addressed in the
questionnaire. Depending on the possible answers, the independent variables are of three main
types: two are based on a five-point Likert scale of importance, four are binary and one is a
six-level ordered variable.
The five-point Likert scale variables result from an assessment of the respondent about the
importance of the driver for the specific agreement; thus, the value 1 means not important at
all, 2 unimportant, 3 of medium importance, 4 important enough and 5 very important. These
variables are:
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120 C. Billitteri et al.
• Transaction-specific investment (d1); the variable expresses how much the respondent believes
that transaction investments are idiosyncratic.
• Depth of innovation (d2); the variable expresses how much the respondent believes that the
object of the agreement (product or technology) is a deep innovation. As already discussed,
the higher the extent of biotechnology process in the object of the agreement, the deeper has
been considered the innovation. Moreover, deep innovations have been considered also in
consideration of the ‘technological distance’. Thus, respondents have autonomously expressed
their evaluation on innovation depth once the interviewer has clarified the above concepts.
The following variables are dummy:
• Therapeutic area (d4): 0 if the agreement concerns a therapeutic area where the pharmaceutical
company is already specialised; 1 otherwise.
• Integration of the pharma in the biotech field (d5): 0 if the pharma is a biopharmaceutical firm;
1 if it is a pure pharma.
• Previous relations (d6): 0 if the two companies have never entered into any agreement in the
past; 1 if they have already signed at least one agreement.
• Number of commercialised products (d7): 0 if the biotech has never marketed any product in
the past; 1 otherwise.
Finally, the last variable is an ordinal one:
• Development stage of the product/technology (d3): 1, if the product/technology is in the dis-
covery phase or preclinical development; 2, if in phase I of clinical trials; 3, if in phase II; 4, if
in phase III; 5, if in approval stage and 6, if already approved or commercialised.
As previously described, our sample is fairly homogeneous in terms of the size of firms, typology
and decision structure, so that no control variables were needed for our model.
5. Results
In order to analyse data we first conducted a descriptive statistic and a correlation analysis (see
Table 3). Only two variables (d4 and d6) are slightly but significantly correlated; therefore we
decided not to exclude any variable from the regression analysis. The descriptive statistic reveals
a first important result concerning the transaction-specific investment (d1): a mean of 4.47 over
a maximum of 5 indicates that no matter which form of governance adopted, companies believe
that investments are always highly idiosyncratic. So we do not expect the significant results for
this variable that, nevertheless, have been considered in the model.
Then, we conducted a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) on the independent variables in
order to understand if they could be reduced in a smaller number of underlying latent dimensions.
By using a factor loading analysis based on the correlation matrix and by applying the varimax
rotation method, we found that variables d4 and d5 have high loading factors in the fourth com-
ponent (respectively 0.70 and 0.60). This result suggests to us that variable d5 can be omitted by
the regression analysis.
Since the dependent variable is modelled as nominal one at three levels, we have used a
multinomial logistic regression. Results are organised in Table 4, where the reference category is
assumed to be G = 2, that is JVs and M&As.
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for independent variables and correlation matrix.
Independent variables Mean SD Min Max d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6
d1 Transaction-specific
investment
4.47 1.06 1 5
d2 Depth of innovation 3.58 1.52 1 5 0.069
d3 Development
stage of the
product/technology
3.52 1.97 1 6 0.221 −0.130
d4 Therapeutic area 0.35 0.48 0 1 0.223 0.038 −0.032
d5 Integration in the
biotech field
0.35 0.48 0 1 0.100 −0.177 −0.011 0.056
d6 Previous relations 0.27 0.44 0 1 −0.143 −0.093 0.013 −0.362∗∗ −0.178
d7 No. of commercialised
products
0.29 0.45 0 1 −0.166 −0.165 0.045 0.064 −0.026 0.085
∗,∗∗Correlation is significant at the 0.05 and the 0.01 level respectively.
Table 4. Multinomial Logit regression model results.
G Coef. SE Wald p-value
0 Intercept 2.016 2.868 0.494 0.482
d1 Transaction-specific investment −0.254 0.509 0.250 0.617
d2 Depth of innovation −0.209 0.341 0.376 0.540
d3 Development stage −0.050 0.311 0.026 0.872
d4 Therapeutic area −0.737 1.051 0.492 0.483
d6 Previous relations 1.368 1.050 1.697 0.193
d7 No. of commercialised products −2.739 1.270 4.655 0.031∗∗
1 Intercept 11.914 5.563 4.587 0.032∗∗
d1 Transaction-specific investment −0.415 0.602 0.476 0.490
d2 Depth of innovation −0.908 0.737 1.518 0.218
d3 Development stage −3.071 1.199 6.555 0.010∗∗
d4 Therapeutic area 1.178 1.892 0.387 0.534
d6 Previous relations 5.717 3.019 3.587 0.058∗
d7 No. of commercialised products −9.596 3.965 5.857 0.016∗∗
Note: ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.005. The reference category is 2. McFadden pseudo R2:
0.543; Cox and Snell pseudo R2: 0.682; Negelkerke pseudo R2: 0.776; Log likelihood: −47.747.
χ2: 58.488 (p < 0.01).
As can be seen, despite the small size of our sample, the model has a significant explanatory
power, as demonstrated by the χ2 test on the observed log likelihood. Also the McFadden Pseudo
R2 reveals an acceptable value. However, most likely owing to small sample size, only three of the
independent variables have significant coefficients. In particular, variables d3 and d6, namely the
development stage of the product and the existence of previous relations are significant only at level
G = 1. In particular, the negative coefficient for d3 (−3.071) confirms that, as hypothesised in H3,
hierarchy-oriented governance forms, such as JVs and M&As, are more likely than non-equity
alliances when d3 assumes high values. Also the positive coefficient for d6 (5.717) confirms,
as hypothesised in H6, that the existence of previous relations makes non-equity alliances more
likely than JVs or M&As. On the contrary, variable d7, namely the number of commercialised
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products by the biotech firm is significant at both levels of G. The negative value of the coefficient
at G = 1 (−9.596) confirms that high values of d7 are more likely associated with JVs or M&As,
when compared with non-equity alliances, supporting hypothesis H7; however, the increasing
negative level of the coefficient at G = 0 (−2.739), while it confirms that higher values of d7 are
more likely associated with JVs or M&As than with licensing agreements, does not confirm that
these last governance forms are less likely than non-equity alliances. Thus, in this case, we find
a sort of U-shaped behaviour when moving along the governance forms continuum.
6. Discussion and conclusion
This research aims at identifying factors affecting decision making on the governance mode
of IFRs in the Italian biopharmaceutical industry. The main findings of this paper are that the
development stage of the product/technology (d3) object of the agreement, the existence of pre-
vious relations (d6) between the partners and the number of commercialised products (d7) by
the biotech firm actually influence such decision. As far as d3, the empirical evidence highlights
that when the object of the collaborative agreement is a late-stage product the pharmaceutical
company prefers a hierarchical governance form (JV or M&A). This result supports the RO and
PRT view of the relation between technological uncertainty and governance form; indeed, through
an integrated governance, the pharmaceutical firm can acquire the product’s rights avoiding any
potential costly hold-up issues. Also, this result confirms the prevalence of the pharmaceutical
company point of view, since, as we have already stressed, the biotech company will have an
opposite view regarding this driver. It is also quite interesting to notice how Santoro and McGill
(2005) find an opposite result for this driver that, in the authors’ view, is supportive of TCE
considerations; they find that alliances in early stages rely on more hierarchical governance. In
our opinion, this difference might be due to the distinct characteristics of firms in the two data
sets; indeed, Santoro and McGill (2005) use data on US and non-US public biotech and pharma
firms and surely biotech companies in their sample have greater bargaining power than the Italian
ones, pushing the agreement towards a more contractual one in case of late stage products. On
the contrary, Italian biotech companies are, for the most part, very small and they are not able
to put up resistance to the excessive power of pharmaceutical companies; moreover, the limited
development of the venture capital industry in Italy compared with the other countries strengthens
these differences.
Then, as far as the result for the existence of previous relations (d6), it is quite expected and it
confirms the view that trust can be a substitute for hierarchical contracts, as in Gulati (1995) and
Santoro and McGill (2005).
Finally, with regard to the number of commercialised product (d7) by the biotech firm, we
believe that the explanation of the U-shaped result for d7 comes again from the controversial
perspective problem between the partners; indeed, there are two possible cases when the num-
ber of commercialised products is high: (i) the pharmaceutical firm succeeds in integrating the
biotech, acquiring all its products rights; (ii) the pharmaceutical firm fails to achieve an integra-
tion, because the biotech’s bargaining power is high enough to hold out against an acquisition and
thus the pharmaceutical part can only obtain the products rights through licensing agreements.
Thus, M&As and JVs from one side and licensing agreements from the other side are more likely
to happen when d7 is high, the most likely governance forms being M&As and JVs because, as
hypothesised in H7, these are the governance forms preferred by the pharmaceutical company.
Thus, our research contributes to the existing literature on alliance governance in the following
ways. First, we provide insights on the complementarity of transaction costs, resource-based,
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Drivers influencing the governance of inter-firm relationships 123
property rights and real option perspectives in explaining firm governance preferences, contribut-
ing to a literature strand that supports the integration of several theoretical approaches for a
deeper understanding of rationales for governance of IFRs (Leiblein, 2003; Foss and Roemer,
2010). Indeed, this is, to the best of our knowledge, the first empirical research in the biopharma-
ceutical industry, integrating drivers belonging to different theoretical perspectives. Furthermore,
our results confirm the validity of this integrated approach; indeed, looking at Table 2 and focus-
ing just on the confirmed hypotheses, the reader can see how several theoretical contributions
(TCE, RO, PRT, the concept of absorptive capacity) provide explanations to the problem of the
governance choice. This is certainly an advance with regard to the available literature that mainly
provides a comparison of pairs of the main theoretical strands. Also, we want to emphasise again
the importance of the concept of ‘absorptive capacity’ in explaining the governance of IFRs, as
also stressed by Contractor and Ra (1992). To our best knowledge, however, there is no other
empirical study, apart from a case study analysis conducted by O’Dwyer and O’Flynn (2005),
confirming the prediction that the concept of ‘absorptive capacity’ poses on governance form
selection.
Second, our research highlights the importance of considering the dual perspective in bio-
pharmaceuticals IFRs, since pharmas and biotechs often have conflicting goals about the
governance mode selection, thus, it strongly depends on their relative bargaining powers. We
are aware that, in this paper we just pose this problem from a theoretical point of view, but we do
not face it from an empirical point of view, since we do not have data from pure biotech firms in
our survey. Of course, this will be a path for further development of this research.
Third, this paper empirically confirms how uncertainty, appropriation concern and trust influ-
ence the governance choice in biopharmaceutical IFRs, results already discussed in the literature.
However, we find that a new driver, i.e. the functional completeness of a firm, measured here by
the number of commercialised products by the biotech company, is also important in determining
this choice. The variable is particular significant in our analysis and we think it can be a good
proxy of the contractual power of the biotech company. Nevertheless, it has never been considered
in the literature; thus, our framework enlarges the set of drivers influencing the governance modes
in biopharmaceutical industry beyond those most considered by the literature.
Our study has several managerial implications. First, we propose an operationalised framework
for making governance decisions in biopharmaceutical IFRs. The advantage of our approach, from
a managerial perspective, consists of having a formulated hypothesis directly on operationalised
measures – this makes the theoretical framework easily applicable in the industrial practice.
Indeed, most of the scholars having faced the same subject, formulate hypotheses on general
issues such as ‘technology uncertainty’, ‘technology newness’, ‘partner uncertainty’, ‘task uncer-
tainty’ and so forth. However, all these issues may be operationalised through different measures.
For instance technology uncertainty in the biopharmaceutical industry might depend on the devel-
opment stage, but also on the integration of the pharma in the biotechnology field. Thus, in this case
managers consider the question of ‘how can I measure technology uncertainty?’. In our framework
we provide a specific answer to this question, because we formulate hypotheses directly on an
operationalised driver such as the development stage; thus, managers can have an indication of
how such a specific driver influences the choice of governance form. This, indeed, is an important
managerial implication of our work.
Second, our focus on bargaining power provides interesting indications to managers in charge
of IFRs in this industry. They must be aware that the industry context, the Italian one in this
case, matters – indeed, in some more mature contexts, the contractual power between the partners
could be significantly different, leading to different governance solutions. Then, managers need
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to carefully evaluate measures of functional completeness, such as the number of commercialised
products of the biotech firm, when approaching IFRs in biopharmaceutical industry.
There are limitations to this study. The most important one is that we rely solely on field-based
primary data of a specific country and that the small sample size deriving from this choice may
undermine the reliability and generalisability of our results. The small sample size might also
provide an explanation for the non-significance of some variables. Therefore, we recognise that,
despite the confirmative approach used in this paper, the theoretical framework needs a further
confirmation through a larger dataset including other countries with a similar industry structure
or through a worldwide comprehensive databank analysis.
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